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I. INTRODUCTION 
The popularity of social networking sites has increased dramatically 
over the past decade. A recent report indicated that thirty-eight percent of 
online users have a social networking profile.1 Many of these social 
networking site users (SNS users) post or provide personal information 
over the internet every day. According to the latest OfCom study, the 
average adult SNS user has profiles on 1.6 sites and most check their 
profiles at least once every other day.2 However, the recent rise in social 
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 1. See Richard Wray, Social Networking Booming with Doubling of Online Profiles, Oct. 16, 
2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/oct/16/social-netwrkign-facebook-
internet. 
 2. See Ofcom, SOCIAL NETWORKING: A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
REPORT INTO ATTITUDES, BEHAVIORS & USE 5 (2008), available at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/advice/media_literacy/medlitpub/medlitpubrss/ 
socialnetworking/report.pdf. 
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networking activity has opened the door to the misuse and abuse of 
personal information through identity theft, cyber stalking, and 
undesirable screenings by prospective employers.3 Behavioral 
advertising programs have also misused personal information available 
on social networking sites.4 Society is now facing an important question: 
what level of privacy should be expected and required within the social 
networking environment?5 
As social networking technology has raced forward, it has left 
corresponding legislation in the dust. Although several countries have 
enacted various laws governing personal data protection to address this 
growing problem, these data protection laws have remained sorely 
inadequate to protect personal information in the social networking 
environment. 
In this Article, we wish to focus our attention on the Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC (DPD), which the European Commission enacted in 
1995. It was drafted long before the web 2.0 era, and therefore without 
social networking in mind. As we will explain below, strictly applying 
the DPD to some SNS users—in particular, those acting as “data 
controllers” under the DPD—is highly problematic and impractical. To 
understand why, we will first explain more about the DPD—namely, its 
definitions and what it requires of those falling under the definition of 
“data controller.”6 
This Article is divided into six parts. Part II will explain the 
background of the DPD with a focus on the definition of data controller 
and the obligations required by those who are considered data 
controllers. It will also explain the estaKblishment of supervisory 
authorities in each Member State and the establishment of the Article 29 
Working Party. Part III will then discuss the problems inherent in strictly 
applying the DPD within the social networking context. Part IV will 
explore attempts to create a workable model for personal data protection 
within the social networking environment. It will explore methods 
several countries have used to protect personal data in the social 
 
 3. See Gray, Zeggane & Maxwell, US and EU Authorities Review Privacy Threats on Social 
Networking Sites, 19(4) ENT. L. REV. 69 (2008); IAN BROWN ET AL., STALKING 2.0: PRIVACY 
PROTECTION IN A LEADING SOCIAL NETWORKING SITE, 
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/gikii/docs2/edwards.pdf. 
 4. For an in-depth analysis, see SPRINGER SCIENCE, PROFILING THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN 
(Mireille Hildebrandt & Serge Gutwirth eds., 2008). 
 5. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOUR & 
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET (2007). 
 6. However, as discussed infra Part IV.D, p. 24, the Article 29 Working Party—an 
organization setup under the DPD—recently published an opinion that attempts to explain the extent 
to which the DPD is likely to apply to social networking providers and users. 
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networking context and the possible utilization of several exemptions to 
liability found in the DPD. Part IV will also discuss the Article 29 
Working Party’s recently issued Opinion regarding the applicability of 
the DPD to social networking users. Part V will offer recommendations 
for going forward with data protection in the social networking realm. 
Finally, Part VI will summarize and conclude this Article. 
 
II. BACKGROUND TO THE EU DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE 
 
A. DPD Applies to Data Controllers 
 
The EU enacted the DPD in 1995. The DPD regulates the processing 
of personal data, i.e., any information relating to an identifiable person.7 
The DPD separates those involved with the processing of personal data 
into two categories: “data subjects” and “data controllers.” The DPD 
defines a data subject as the identifiable person to whom the personal 
data relates.8 The DPD states that a data controller “shall mean the 
natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which 
alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data . . . .”9 Responsibility for compliance with 
the DPD rests on the data controller. 
As we will discuss further in Part III below, the language defining 
the role of data controllers supports the view that individuals who post 
information about others on the internet or who use others’ information 
found on the internet for a certain purpose would be regarded as data 
controllers. Thus, social networking companies, individual users, and 
those who use information posted on social networks could each be 
classified as a data controller under the DPD, and therefore could be 
subject to the attendant requirements.10 
B. Supervisory Authorities and the Article 29 Working Party 
The DPD requires each Member State to appoint a “supervisory 
authority” to monitor the application of the DPD within its territory.11 
Besides monitoring the application of the DPD in its territory, the 
 
 7. See Council Directive 95/46, art. 2(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) (defining personal data 
as “information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”). 
 8. See id. 
 9. Id. art. 2(d). 
 10. See supra text accompanying note 6. The implication of the Article 29 Working Party’s 
opinion is examined below in Part IV. 
 11. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 7, art. 28. 
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supervisory authority is endowed with power either to engage in legal 
proceedings where national laws adopted pursuant to the DPD have been 
violated or to bring violations to the attention of judicial authorities.12 
Furthermore, each Member State is required to consult with the 
supervisory authority when drafting “administrative measures or 
regulations relating to the protection of individuals’ rights and freedoms 
with regard to the processing of personal data.”13 
The DPD also established what has become known as the Article 29 
Working Party (Working Party).14 The Working Party is partly 
comprised of representatives of the supervisory authorities designated by 
each Member State.15 Under Article 30(1), the Working Party has a duty 
to: 
 
a)examine any question covering the application of the national 
measures adopted under this Directive in order to contribute 
to the uniform application of such measures; 
b)give the Commission an opinion on the level of protection in 
the Community and in third countries; 
c)advise the Commission on any proposed amendment of this 
Directive, on any additional or specific measures to 
safeguard the rights and freedoms of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on any other 
proposed Community measures affecting such rights and 
freedoms; 
d)give an opinion on codes Community level.16 
 
Furthermore, the Working Party “may, on its own initiative, make 
recommendations on all matters relating to the protection of persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data in the Community.”17 As will 
be discussed below, in June 2009 the Working Party issued an Opinion 
regarding the applicability of the DPD in the social networking context. 
 
 12. See id. art. 28.3. 
 13. Id. art. 28.2. 
 14. See id. art. 29.1. 
 15. See id. art. 29.2. 
 16. Id. art. 30.1. 
 17. Id. art. 30.3. 
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III. PROBLEMS APPLYING THE DPD IN THE SOCIAL NETWORKING 
CONTEXT 
Under a strict reading of the DPD, both social networking providers 
and users are likely subject to the responsibilities of data controllers. 
Social networking providers are clearly data controllers as defined by the 
DPD because they “determine the purposes and means of the processing 
of personal data” by providing a social networking platform in the first 
place.18 The purpose for processing the personal data is usually to allow 
users to engage in social networking so that advertisers can use 
information posted on user profiles to better target their ads. The means 
for processing personal data is determined by the provider based on the 
setup and organization of the social networking site. 
However, under the DPD individual social networking users are also 
likely to be considered data controllers because they too “determine the 
purposes and means of the processing of personal data.”19 Social 
networking users post personal data or information about others on their 
own user profiles or on their friends’ profiles using text, photographs, 
and video. Each user has a purpose for posting (or processing) personal 
data and chooses how (the means) it is to be posted. Thus, although 
individual SNS users could be classified as data controllers, imposing the 
requirements of data controllers on them without modification does not 
seem practical under the DPD. Such a classification raises multiple 
questions and problems. 
This section will (1) highlight the differences between 
organizational data controllers (such as MySpace, Facebook, and 
Twitter) and individual data controllers (such as SNS users) to illustrate 
the impracticability of applying the DPD to SNS users, and (2) point out 
the possibility of widespread liability and litigation that is likely to ensue 
if the DPD is strictly enforced against SNS users. 
A. Impracticability of Applying the DPD to Individuals in the 
Social Networking Context 
The differences between typical organizational data controllers and 
individual data controllers operating in the social networking context 
make strict application of the DPD difficult. As explained above, 
individuals who either post another person’s information on their own 
profile or use information found on another person’s profile would be 
 
 18. Id. art. 2(d). 
 19. Id. 
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deemed data controllers and would therefore be subject to the obligations 
imposed on data controllers by the DPD. Obligations for data controllers 
are littered throughout the DPD. For the purpose of this Article, only a 
few are mentioned here. As explained below, applying these obligations 
to individual users would be highly impractical, if not impossible. 
First, the DPD requires that data controllers process all data lawfully 
and fairly.20 To require every user (as a data controller) to do this within 
a social networking environment would be an unrealistic objective. It is 
difficult to imagine the effects of requiring all individual SNS users to 
consult the laws of his or her country and accurately determine whether 
or not the information in a particular post is lawful and fair before 
posting it. After a period of adjustment, it is plausible that SNS users 
would become familiar with the body of law applicable to the types of 
posts that they routinely make on social networking sites. However, even 
if the public were largely successfully at becoming familiar with the 
mandates of this requirement, policing and monitoring would be very 
difficult for the Supervisory Authorities because of the incredible 
number of users that exist. 
Second, the DPD requires that data controllers supply data subjects 
with certain information, such as (1) “the identity of the controller,” (2) 
“the purposes of the processing for which the data are intended,” and (3) 
“the recipients . . . of the data.”21 It is customary for an organizational 
data controller to provide this type of information to the data subject; 
however, it is less customary, if not unheard of, for a SNS user to do so. 
For example, a company would likely provide this information to a data 
subject in order to gain trust and entice them to supply personal 
information. However, SNS users usually have no need to entice data 
subjects to supply personal information because oftentimes SNS users 
already have the data subject’s personal information under their control. 
Furthermore, it is nearly impossible for a SNS user to determine who 
will receive a subject’s personal data because the information users post 
is often public and accessible to the entire world. 
Third, the DPD requires that information collected by data 
controllers concerning data subjects be “adequate, relevant and not 
excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or 
for which they are further processed.”22 Again, this provision is more 
applicable to an organization. It would be unusual to require a SNS user 
 
 20. See id. art. 6.1(a). 
 21. Id. art. 10. 
 22. Id. art. 6.1(c). 
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to determine whether he has necessarily provided information about 
other individuals that is “adequate, relevant and not excessive,” since the 
user himself provides the information and determines the purpose for 
which data is processed. In other words, the SNS user determines the 
scope of his or her profile and the information it contains. 
Finally, in addition to the aforementioned rules, the DPD not only 
requires that a data controller obtain the data subject’s consent to process 
the data subject’s personal data, but also that the data controller obtain 
consent for the specific purpose for which that data is being processed.23 
It would be impractical to require SNS users to fulfill this consent 
requirement. In the social networking realm, it is not customary to ask 
permission before posting another’s personal information, such as a 
photo or video. Although some data subjects may have consented to the 
processing of personal data by posting personal information on their own 
profile, this does not mean they have necessarily consented to have 
fellow SNS users process this data. In other words, it is likely that the 
data subject may have only consented for one purpose24—namely, to 
have the data available only to a limited group to which the user has 
granted access—not to have it available to those who have access to 
another SNS user’s profile, other third parties, employers, or the wider 
public. 
It is unwise to require SNS users to comply with the obligations that 
the DPD requires of data controllers as presently constituted. The 
numerous obligations of data controllers, not to mention others which are 
not discussed here, make it easy to see why a SNS user might be 
discouraged from posting information about others. Also, strict 
enforcement of the DPD (or corresponding national data protection laws) 
as applied to SNS users remains uncertain because personal information 
is readily available on social networking sites and many users have 
already consented to have this information accessible to others.25 
Furthermore, it defeats the original purpose of the DPD, which was 
originally legislated to address the copious amount of personal data 
processed electronically by organizations rather than by individuals. 
Questions which remain unanswered and that must be considered by 
the E.U. in the future are: 
 
 23. See id. art. 7(a). 
 24. See generally James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137 (2009) 
(discussing SNS in-depth). 
 25. Cf. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 7, art. 7–8 (requiring “unambiguous” consent for 
the processing of normal data per article 7(a) of the DPD and “explicit consent” under Article 8 for 
the processing of special categories of data). 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 6 
134 
 
1)Would it be fair or practical to hold individuals who post 
information and photographs about friends and family to the 
strict requirements of “data controllers” under the DPD? 
2)Should the obligations and consequences for individuals be the 
same at all times as those for organizations? 
3)Should a new category be created for individual data 
controllers with obligations adjusted accordingly? Would 
such a category be feasible? 
4)Would application of the DPD to SNS users stifle social 
networking because individuals would not want to go 
through the trouble of understanding and complying with 
DPD provisions? Conversely, would application of the DPD 
have a positive effect—a heightened awareness of user 
responsibilities in a user-generated environment? 
B. Liability and Enforcement 
With millions of SNS users, the current liability of user-generated 
content under the DPD is potentially limitless. It is unclear whether the 
DPD is a suitable framework for resolving civil disputes involving the 
misuse of personal information. The E.U. must re-evaluate the direction 
of the DPD as it applies to social networking in order to better protect 
individuals and prevent the potential rise of litigation.26 
Questions that need to be considered by the E.U. in the future are: 
 
1)How easily and how often is personal data (and potentially 
false data) about others circulated? 
2)Should there be an opportunity to remedy any resulting 
damage? If such an opportunity exists, then to whom and 
how far should liability extend? 
3)Should the DPD (or national data protection laws) be enforced 
strictly, considering that personal information is readily 
available on social networking sites and that users have 
 
 26. See generally Resolution on Privacy Protection in Social Network Services, 30th 
International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Strasbourg, Oct. 17, 2008, 
available at 
http://www.privacyconference2008.org/adopted_resolutions/STRASBOURG2008/resolution_social
_networks_en.pdf (espousing, by way of resolution, recommendations of a panel, convened in 
October 2008 at Strasbourg, Germany, regarding SNS; main recommendations include: more user 
control of profile data, data security through default privacy settings, easy termination of user 
profiles, the creation and use of pseudonymous profiles as an option, and that external search 
engines have the ability to index user profiles only when a user has given explicit, prior, and 
informed consent). 
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consented to have this information accessible to others?27 
4)When complications arise, should the DPD be enforced by 
Data Protection Authorities, by private right of action, or by 
some other means? 
 
In sum, the social networking structure creates difficulties and 
challenges for applying the DPD because it imposes responsibilities on 
individuals (not only organizations) regarding how they use information 
about others. Whether liability under the DPD is a suitable or preferred 
method for resolving civil disputes involving the posting/publication of 
personal data on profiles is even less clear. Furthermore, it is not yet 
certain whether the DPD will be strictly enforced against SNS users by 
Data Protection Authorities or by a private right of action when 
complications arise. 
IV. ATTEMPTS TO CREATE A WORKABLE MODEL FOR PERSONAL DATA 
PROTECTION IN THE SOCIAL NETWORKING ENVIRONMENT 
From a discussion of the inherent problems of a strict application of 
the DPD in the social networking context naturally follows an analysis of 
what attempts are being made to solve these problems. This section will 
(1) take a look at the various approaches which have been taken in 
several countries to implement and apply the DPD in the social 
networking environment, (2) review the recommendations made by the 
International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications 
(Working Group), (3) consider the possible utilization of liability 
exemptions found in the DPD, and (4) discuss the Working Party’s 
recently published Opinion concerning the DPD and social networking 
related issues. 
A. Different Approaches Taken by Various Countries 
The Privacy Commissioners from Australia, Canada, Germany, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom have all tried to address the complex 
issues concerning social networks. Several of these countries have 
provided frameworks28 around the use of social networks, but some fall 
 
 27. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 7, art. 7–8 and accompanying text. 
 28. See, e.g., Australian Government: Office of the Privacy Commissioner, 
http://www.privacy.gov.au/index.php (last visited Apr.  15, 2010); United Kingdom: Information 
Commissioner’s Office, http://www.ico.gov.uk/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2010); and Australasian Legal 
Information Institute: Privacy Protection Agencies, http://www.austlii.edu.au/catalog/279.html (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
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short in providing tangible steps to regulate individuals within the social 
networking context.29 
1) Australia 
In Australia, the Privacy Commissioner posted a media release titled 
“Protect Your Privacy on Social Networking Sites.”30 The release urges 
users to be aware of the risks associated with using social networking 
sites and advises them to take a common sense approach to protecting 
their personal information. This includes reading the privacy policy and 
being careful about what personal information is shared. Although the 
Privacy Commissioner has warned SNS users of possible conflicts 
associated with posting personal information on these sites, it does not 
appear that Australia has set forth any specific regulations pertaining to 
social networks. To date, there have not been any legal cases brought in 
Australia related to social networking and privacy. 
2)  Canada 
In Canada, the Privacy Commissioner has proactively warned 
citizens of the dangers associated with sharing personal information on 
social networking sites.31 For example, the Privacy Commissioner 
produced a video titled, “What Does a Friend of a Friend of a Friend 
Need to Know About You” highlighting the perils of social networking. 
Recently, four University of Ottawa law students submitted a 
complaint before the Privacy Commissioner alleging that Facebook had 
given their personal information to marketers without their consent.32 In 
July 2009, the Privacy Commissioner issued a decision regarding this 
case in which the Commissioner concluded that Facebook needed to 
improve its privacy practices to comply with Canada’s privacy laws.33 
The Commissioner also determined that the allegations against Facebook 
concerning misrepresentation, deception, and Facebook Mobile were not 
well-founded. However, the Privacy Commissioner held that the 
allegations concerning third-party applications, account deactivation and 
 
 29. This list is exemplary, not exhaustive. 
 30. The full text of the Media Release is available at 
http://www.privacy.gov.au/news/media07_print.html. 
 31. Posting of Colin McKay to Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 
http://blog.privcom.gc.ca/index.php/2007/10/10/social-networking-and-privacy (Oct. 10, 2007). 
 32. Associated Press, Canada Launches Privacy Probe Into Facebook, USA TODAY, May 31, 
2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-05-31-1179330323_x.htm. 
 33. Additional details can be found on the CIPPIC website available at 
http://www.cippic.ca/en/. 
SPRING 2010  Data Protection: Social Networking 
137 
 
deletion, accounts of deceased users, and non-users’ personal 
information were in breach of the PIPEDA Act.34 The Assistant 
Commissioner further held: “Facebook did not have adequate safeguards 
in place to prevent unauthorized access by application developers to 
users’ personal information, and furthermore was not doing enough to 
ensure that meaningful consent was obtained from individuals for the 
disclosure of their personal information to application developers.”35 
Facebook was given thirty days to implement measures to rectify these 
problems.36 This Canadian decision exemplifies how countries might 
regulate the use of personal data on social networking sites. 
3) Germany 
In Germany, the current developments involving social networking 
sites, data controllers, and online activities are impacted by the German 
Federal Data Protection Act 2001 (German FDPA).37 This Act applies to 
federal public bodies and private organizations.38 The German 
Telemedia Act regulates online activities.39 Under the German 
 
 34. See ELIZABETH DENHAM, OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, REPORT 
OF FINDINGS INTO THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE CANADIAN INTERNET POLICY AND PUBLIC 
INTEREST CENTER (CIPPIC) AGAINST FACEBOOK, INC. UNDER THE PIPEDA (2009), available at 
http://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2009/2009_008_0716_e.pdf; see also Michael Geist, Privacy 
Commissioner Finds Facebook Violating Canadian Privacy Law, July 16, 2009, 
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4139/125/; Robin Wauters, Canadian Privacy 
Commissioner says Facebook is Full of Holes, July 16, 2009, 
http://techcrunch.com/2009/07/16/canadian-privacy-commissioner-says-facebook-is-full-of-holes/. 
 35. DENHAM, supra note 34, at 3. 
 36. See id. at 4. 
 37. Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [German Federal Data Protection Act] May 22, 2001, 
BGBI. I at 904 (F.R.G.); the Federal Data Protection Act has recently been amended to strengthen 
the Data Protection Act, but those changes are not considered here. For more information, see 
generally Robert Alan Heym et al., Germany: Changes to the German Federal Data Protection Act: 
An Overview, MONDAQ, Apr. 7, 2009, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp ?articleid=76712. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See generally Telemediengesetz [TMG] [German Telemedia Act] Feb. 16, 2007 BGBI. I 
at 179 (F.R.G.). Detailed analysis of the German Telemedia Act is provided by Professor Thomas 
Hoeren, Das Telemediengesetz, Mar. 19, 2007, 
http://128.176.101.170/hoeren_veroeffentlichungen/telemediengesetz.pdf (only available in 
German). See also Henning Krieg, German Telemedia Act Introduces New Rules for New Media, 
Mar. 5, 2007, 
http://www.twobirds.com/English/News/Articles/Pages/German_Tele_Media_Act_new_rules.aspx; 
Alexander Scheuer, Telemedia Act Adopted, http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2007/3/article17.en.html 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2010);  Hunton and Williams LLP, German Data Protection Authorities Issue 
Resolution on Website Analysis Methods, Jan. 7, 2010, 
http://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2010/01/articles/european-union-1/german-data-protection-
authorities-issue-resolution-on-website-analysis-
methods/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign 
=Feed%3A+PrivacyInformationSecurityLawBlog+%28Privacy+%26+Information+Security+Law+
Blog%29). 
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Telemedia Act, social networking sites fall within the scope of the 
German FDPA unless user profiles on the sites are made strictly 
private.40 The German FDPA is likely to apply to social networking 
providers,41 but is unclear as to whether the FDPA would extend to SNS 
users who post information about others and whether this use of personal 
information would be exempted by the “literary or journalistic purposes” 
or “private purposes” exemptions found in the FDPA.42 The Berlin Data 
Protection Commissioner, who publishes guidelines on social networking 
and data protection issues,43 expressed his view as to whether SNS users 
qualify as data controllers as follows: 
 
Whether a subscriber would be held as a controller of 
such [third party personal] data, will depend on the 
degree to which these data are accessible to others, e.g., 
a photo album held on the server of a social network 
provider only accessible to the subscriber himself would 
fall under the exemption for “purely personal or 
household activities” in Art. 3 para. 2 of Directive 95/46 
resp. Para. 1 section 2 No. 3 of the Federal German Data 
Protection Act. If such data are made available to others, 
the subscriber may well be held as a controller of such 
data depending on the degree of public availability. This 
would need to be determined according to the 
circumstances in every single case.44 
 
Another legal expert on data protection issues in Germany expressed 
a slightly different view. According to Dr. Ulrich Wuermeling, a SNS 
user who uploads material to a social networking site would be regarded 
as the controller of the data until it is uploaded.45 Once the data is 
 
 40. See German Telemedia Act, supra note 39. 
 41. See Data Protection Commissioner Warns over Social Networking Sites, Dec. 27, 2009, 
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5060457,00.html; see also Facebook Comes under German 
Law, Feb. 20, 2010, http://www.thelocal.de/sci-tech/20100220-25389.html. 
 42. See “Literary or Journalistic Purposes” exemption under the DPD is discussed infra Part 
IV.C.2. 
 43. See generally The International Working Group, The Common Position of German Data 
Protection Oversight Authorities for the Private Sector (“Düsseldorfer Kreis”) (April 2008), 
available at http://www.datenschutz-Berlin.de/attachments /487/Düsseldorfer KreisApril 2008-
Datenschutzkonforme-Gestaltung-sozialer-Netzwerke.pdf?1212737975 (only available in German). 
 44. E-mail from Berlin Data Protection Commissioner’s Office (Sept. 12, 2008) (on file with 
author) (emphasis added). 
 45. Many thanks to Dr. Ulrich Wuermeling of Latham and Watkins, LLP for his insights into 
this subject. 
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uploaded, the social networking provider would become the data 
controller. Even if these social networking providers invoked the 
“literary or journalistic purposes” exemption it would not prevent the 
application of the German FDPA or the Telemedia Act. To date, there 
are no legal cases in Germany that test either of these opposing views or 
that determine the extent to which data protection laws apply to social 
networking providers in Germany. 
4)  Sweden 
In Sweden, the Personal Data Act of 1998 regulates the processing of 
personal data and implements the DPD.46 The Swedish Data Inspection 
Board (SDIB) has issued guidelines for the protection of personal data in 
the social networking context, but has yet to clearly establish the scope 
of a data controller under the DPD. According to the SDIB, the Personal 
Data Act 1998 only regulates personal data that is published by people or 
organizations that are established in Sweden. However, a major problem 
with this geographic approach to personal data protection is tracing the 
source of the offending information. At any rate, like its German 
counterpart, the SDIB has yet to hear any personal data protection cases 
involving social networking sites and has yet to issue any formal 
opinions on the subject.47 
Despite the lack of litigation and issuance of formal opinions, the 
SDIB has done more than rest upon its laurels. At the beginning of 2008, 
the SDIB surveyed young adults and teenagers in an attempt to better 
understand their experiences with Facebook.48 According to the results, 
half of those surveyed reported that they had been portrayed falsely or 
unfairly on the internet.49 One out of every five had been victims of 
identity theft on the internet. Twenty-nine percent of the young women 
had been sexually harassed on the Internet.50 Eighty-six percent of those 
surveyed reported that they have published photographs of themselves51 
and, surprisingly, thirty percent of those surveyed reported that another 
 
 46. See Swedish Personal Data Act of 1998, available at 
http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/01/55/42/ b451922d.pdf. 
 47. Telephone Interview with Elizabeth Wallin, Legal Advisor, Data Inspection Board (Sep. 9 
2008). 
 48. See PETER SILJERUD ET AL., UNGDOMAR OCH INTEGRITET (2008), 
http://www.datainspektionen.se/Documents/rapport-ungdom2008.pdf (available only in Swedish). 
 49. See id. at 8. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. at 9; see also Every Other Young Person Has Been Offended on the Internet, 
http://www.datainspektionen.se/in-english/every-other-young-person-has-been-offended-on-the-
internet/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2010) (discussing that there is a great deal of resistance to others 
publishing photographs without asking permission). 
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user had published a photograph of them without their permission. 
According to the SDIB, despite these negative experiences, young adults 
and teenagers continue to reveal personal information on the internet. An 
SDIB member, Göran Gräslund, indicated that more needs to be done to 
make young adults and teenagers more cautious when revealing personal 
information on the internet: 
 
Behaviour that involves risk does not seem to be 
attributable to lack of knowledge; rather, the problem 
seems to be a basic attitude to personal integrity. If we 
are to change attitudes, everyone must help: decision-
makers, teachers and especially parents.52 
 
While Sweden has identified the importance of instructing everyone, 
especially young adults, of being cautious about providing personal 
information, Sweden has yet to take the more proactive step of 
establishing regulations regarding the protection of personal data in the 
social networking context. 
5) United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, the Information Commissioner (ICO) 
recently reviewed complaints on social networking sites. Dating back to 
2005, it was revealed that there were only two complaints made against 
Bebo, five complaints against Facebook, and no complaints against 
MySpace.53 The ICO has determined that individuals generally will not 
be classed as data controllers within the Data Protection Act 1998, and 
that even if this were not the case, the existing exemptions under section 
32—the recreational and journalistic purposes exemptions—would likely 
apply. Furthermore, the ICO, like the SDIB in Sweden, has actively 
published guidelines on social networking and privacy. He recommends 
that youth refrain from revealing too much personal information on 
social networking sites.54 
Moreover, in one significant case, Applause Store Productions, Ltd. 
and Matthew Firsht v. Grant Raphael (Applause),55 the claimant brought 
a legal action against a former friend who posted a false profile of the 
 
 52. Every Other Young Person Has Been Offended on the Internet, supra note 51. 
 53. Written Correspondence from ICO (Sept. 2008) (on file with author). 
 54. See generally United Kingdom: Information Commissioner’s Office, 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/Youth/section3/ intro.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2010). 
 55. Applause Store Prod. Ltd. v. Raphael, [2008] EWHC 1781 (QB). 
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claimant on Facebook.56 The Court found for the claimant on the 
grounds of “misuse of private information.”57 However, the Court should 
also have held the social networking provider liable under the DPD 
because there was no question that some of the statements posted on the 
Facebook profile were defamatory and sensitive personal information.58 
Another issue addressed in the United Kingdom is the extent to 
which third parties (such as employers, banks, and supermarkets) are 
likely to use personal information posted on social networking sites to 
take a peek at the private details of those with whom they deal or may 
deal, and whether these third parties should give notice that they access 
this information on social networking sites. This corollary point will 
need to be addressed in order to make meaningful progress in the future. 
In summary, while these countries have realized the importance of 
warning their citizens about posting information on social networking 
sites, they each lack legislation addressing the consequences that await 
SNS users who post other individual’s personal data. 
B. The International Working Group 
The International Working Group on Data Protection in 
Telecommunications (Working Group) is another body to which we 
should look to find recommendations on the application of the DPD to 
social networking. In March 2008, the Working Group published 
guidelines for the protection of personal data related to social 
networking.59 They took the view that legislators, Data Protection 
Authorities, and social network providers were faced with a situation that 
had no visible past.60 The Working Group recognized that once personal 
information is published on the internet, it may languish there forever, 
even when the data subject has deleted the information from the original 
site.61 The Working Group identified a misleading notion of 
“community” and “intimacy” on social networking sites that encourages 
individuals to share personal information.62 This misperception is 
comparable to a dinner date where a couple believes that they are 
 
 56. See id. at 1, 3. 
 57. Id. at 68. 
 58. This assumes that this type of posting constitutes the processing of personal data within 
the DPD. 
 59. See Rebecca Wong, Social Networking: Anybody is a Data Controller! 7–9 (Nottingham 
L. Sch., Working Paper, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1271668. 
 60. Id. at 11. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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speaking intimately over candlelight but in reality their conversation is 
being amplified through a loudspeaker for all other diners to hear. Some 
information is capable of collection by third parties depending on the 
privacy settings on individual user profiles.63 In fact, the Working Group 
found that one-third of human resource managers admitted to using data 
from social networking sites when evaluating prospective employees.64 
The Working Group was particularly concerned about the rise in 
identity theft through the proliferation of user profiles. To better protect 
personal information, the Working Group recommends that social 
networking providers collect and display as little personal information as 
possible and that they inform users about what personal information is 
required before users register for their services.65 The Working Group 
also recommends that social networking providers implement data 
breach notification services in order to provide users with a better 
understanding of the risks associated with particular social networking 
sites.66 The Working Group further recommends that lawmakers 
attribute more responsibility to social networking providers regarding the 
protection of personal data.67 The Working Group will closely monitor 
future developments and revise and update the guidance when it deems 
necessary.68 These recommendations by the Working Group should be a 
good starting point for social network regulation, but many other issues 
still need to be addressed because of the ability people have to post 
information about others on social networking sites. 
C. Exemptions Under the DPD 
As is typical for most directives, the DPD contains a list of carefully 
drafted exemptions that provide circumstances where the DPD does not 
apply. However, these exemptions were not specifically drafted with 
social networking in mind. As a result, the practical workability of these 
exemptions within the context of social networking is unclear and may 
produce potentially undesirable side effects. Four exemptions found in 
the DPD are discussed below. While the DPD does not give titles to any 
of the following exemptions, for the purposes of this Article they will be 
known as (1) the private purposes exemption, (2) the journalistic 
purposes exemption, (3) the jurisdictional scope exemption, and (4) the 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 12. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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“catchall” exemption. 
1) Private purposes exemption 
Found in Article 3.2 of the DPD, the private purposes exemption 
provides that any “processing of personal data” for “a purely personal or 
household activity” will fall outside the scope of the Data Protection 
Directive.69 Proper application of this exemption within the social 
networking context is tenuous at best. Necessarily, recent opinions and 
court cases have attempted to address the problem. 
The issuance of Opinion 5/2009 on Online Social Networking 
(Opinion) by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (Working 
Party) clarified the application of the private purposes exemption70 to 
social networking sites.71 For example, the Opinion specifically noted 
that certain activities on social networking sites, such as collaboration 
and networking for political, charitable or professional purposes, would 
not fall under the private purposes exemption. Additionally, the private 
purposes exemption may not apply to individuals who post personal 
information on social networking sites that is accessible beyond self-
selected contacts.72 The decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
in the criminal proceeding against Bodil Lindqvist is consistent with this 
view.73 Nevertheless, individuals who post information publicly will 
argue and probably expect that most information posted on the internet 
should fall under the private purposes exemption.74 
2)  Journalistic purpose exemption 
Similar to the application of the private purposes exemption, 
application of the journalistic purposes exemption remains somewhat 
 
 69. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 7, art. 3.2. 
 70. In the Working Party’s Opinion, this exemption is referred to as the “household 
exemption.” See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2009 on Online Social 
Networking, § 3.1, at p. 5, WP 163 (June 12, 2009) [hereinafter WP 163]. 
 71. See infra Part IV.D, for further discussion regarding the application of article 3.2 in 
connection with the Working Party’s Opinion. 
 72. See WP 163, supra note 70, §§ 3.1.1–.2. But see infra note 85, § 36 (reflecting that 
domestic purposes includes “recreational purposes” and thus would possibly warrant that private 
web-pages would be brought within this scope). 
 73. See Case C-101/01, Sweden v. Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12971, ¶¶ 42–47 (holding that 
Article 3.2 would be inapplicable in a situation where personal information is accessible by anyone 
on the Internet, rather than by a limited number of self-selected contacts); see also Rebecca Wong & 
Joseph Savirimuthu, All or Nothing: The Application of Article 3.2 of the Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC to the Internet, 25 JOHN. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 211 (2008). 
 74. See generally PETER SEIPEL, SWEDEN IN NORDIC DATA PROTECTION LAW (Peter Blume 
ed., 2001). 
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unclear within the social networking context. Article 9 of the DPD 
provides exemptions from liability for the processing of personal data 
carried out “solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or 
literary expression.”75 However, this exemption seems to be in direct 
opposition to the aims of the DPD enumerated in Article 1—namely, to 
“protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in 
particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal 
data.”76 These fundamental rights and freedoms include those contained 
within the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).77 Thus, 
Article 10 of the ECHR would also be applicable. Nonetheless, as 
demonstrated by the divergent approaches of Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, safety from liability is not entirely certain for an SNS user 
trying to claim the journalistic purposes exemption. 
Sweden has taken the stance that Article 9 of the DPD should not be 
interpreted strictly, and found that a webpage could still fulfill the 
journalistic purposes criteria.78 Accordingly, if a webpage can qualify for 
the journalistic purposes exemption, it is possible that a social 
networking site could as well. Thus, Sweden takes a broad view of the 
journalistic purposes exemption. 
Expounding upon Sweden’s approach, consider the following likely 
scenario: X works as a journalist and has a blog for reporting his current 
daily activities. X also uses Facebook and Twitter to relay his activities 
to friends and colleagues. What is Article 9’s potential application? 
Under such a fact scenario, it is likely that any reference that X 
makes to certain individuals as part of his report on a blog is likely to be 
covered under Article 9 (or corresponding national legislation). This 
might also extend to simple bloggers who are blogging as a second job. 
In some instances, bloggers may choose to use pseudonyms to protect 
themselves from liability. However, recent changes in the United 
Kingdom law have indicated that bloggers who use a pseudonym are 
unlikely to receive any protection if their identity is revealed by a third 
party source.79 Accordingly, bloggers who are employed by companies 
 
 75. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 7, art. 9. 
 76. Id. art. 1. 
 77. See id., Recitals ¶ 10. 
 78. An example to consider would be the Swedish Supreme Court decision in Ramsbro, 
available at http://dsv.su.se/jpalme/society/Ramsbro-HD-domen.html (in Swedish); see also Lee A. 
Bygrave, Balancing Data Protection and Freedom of Expression in the Context of Website 
Publishing— Recent Swedish Case Law, 18 COMPUTER LAW & SECURITY REPORT 56 (2002); M. 
Klang, Technology, Speech, Law and Ignorance: The State of Free Speech in Sweden, 48 
HERTFORDSHIRE L. J. 7, 7–9 (2003). 
 79. See Author of a Blog v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2009] EWHC (QB) 1358 (reflecting 
that a blogger whose blog is in the public domain does not have a legally enforceable right to 
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should keep in mind that company vetting opens up the possibility that 
their identities may be divulged without their consent. 
Furthermore, cases such as Lindqvist indicate that Member States 
may employ a balancing test to decide whether Article 9 (as 
implemented within the national laws) is applicable.80 For example, 
within the United Kingdom, the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) lays 
out a three-pronged test to decide whether processing was intended for 
“journalistic purposes.”  Section 32 of the DPA states: 
 
[P]ersonal data which are processed for the special 
purposes are exempt from any provision to which this 
subsection relates if: 
a) . . . with a view to the publication by any person 
of any journalistic, literary or artistic material; 
b) the data controller reasonably believes that, 
having regard in particular to the special 
importance of the public interest in freedom of 
expression, publication would be in the public 
interest; and 
c) the data controller reasonably believes that, in all 
the circumstances, compliance with (statutory 
provisions) is incompatible with the special 
purposes.81 
 
The U.K. Court of Appeal, in Campbell v. MGN, indicated that 
section 32 DPA 1998 would be given its “natural meaning and the only 
meaning that makes sense” and would “apply both before and after 
publication,”82 giving some direction on the application of a journalistic 
purposes exemption. In other words, the United Kingdom chose to set a 
high bar before the journalistic purposes exemption could be claimed and 
leaves the burden on the data controller to show that the special purpose 
is applicable to the social networking site. Thus, although one Member 
State in the European Union has tightened the applicability of the 
journalistic purposes exemption, another has potentially expanded it. 
Therefore, the applicability of the journalistic purposes exemption 
 
anonymity in the U.K. because the grounds for confidentiality have not been satisfied). 
 80. See Case C-101/01, Sweden v. Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12971, ¶¶ 89–90. 
 81. Data Protection Act 1998, 1998, c. 29, § 32 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/ukpga_19980029_en_1. 
 82. Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1373, [121] (Eng.), rev’d on other grounds, 
[2004] UKHL 22. 
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remains largely uncertain. 
3)  Jurisdictional scope exemption 
If purpose exemptions cannot be obtained, a data controller may 
attempt, through the location of his activities or equipment, to fall under 
the jurisdictional scope exemption found in Article 4 of the DPD. 83 
Article 4 outlines the territorial jurisdiction of the DPD.84 Thus, the 
applicability of the jurisdictional scope exemption depends on where the 
data controller is based. DPD 4(1)(a) provides that the DPD (or 
corresponding national data protection laws) applies to activities of an 
establishment of the controller which are within the territory of the 
Member State.85 
Moreover, DPD 4(1)(c) expands this jurisdiction to include areas 
where equipment is used to process such information (more difficult to 
show that the user-generated content falls outside the European 
Economic Area).86 For example, because MySpace has an office in the 
United Kingdom, MySpace is considered a data controller established in 
the United Kingdom when data is processed in the context of that 
establishment or when MySpace uses equipment to process data in the 
United Kingdom. Thus, to take advantage of the jurisdictional scope 
exemption, data controllers may only need to relocate residence or 
equipment so that their activities fall outside the jurisdiction of the DPD. 
4) The catchall exemption: Article 13 
Most thoughtfully crafted laws incorporate a provision that allows an 
escape hatch or “catchall” in the event of unforeseen situations. The 
DPD’s catchall exemption is found in Article 13. It states: 
 
Member States may adopt legislative measures to restrict 
the scope of the obligations and rights provided for in 
Articles 6(1),87 10,88 11(1),89 12,90 and 2191 when such 
 
 83. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 7, art. 4. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. art. 4.1(a). 
 86. See id. art. 4.1(c). 
 87. See id. art. 6.1 (enumerating the data protection principles). 
 88. See id. art. 10 (listing the information to be given to the data subject in cases of collection 
of data from the data subject). 
 89. See id. art. 11 (listing the information to be given to the data subject in cases where the 
data have not been collected from the data subject). 
 90. See id. art. 12 (providing for rights of access to data subject’s concerning the processing 
of their personal data). 
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a restriction constitutes a necessary measure to 
safeguard: (a) national security; (b) defense; (c) public 
security; (d) prevention, investigation, detection and 
prosecution of criminal offenses, or of breaches of ethics 
for regulated professions; (e) an important economic or 
financial interest; (f) a monitoring, inspection or 
regulatory function connected with the exercise of 
official authority; and (g) protection of the data subject 
or of the rights and freedoms of others.92   
 
Safeguarding the “protection of the data subject or of the rights and 
freedoms of others” is so general that it effectively creates a catchall. 
Such an exemption could potentially be twisted to fit almost any agenda. 
If no other exemption is obvious, social networking sites are likely to 
seek this final catchall exemption. Thus far, there have been no cases to 
clarify the scope of this final exemption. As with each of the previously 
mentioned exemptions, the applicability of the catchall exemption within 
the social networking context remains uncertain. 
D. Article 29 Working Party’s Opinion on Social Networking 
In response to the uncertainty inherent in applying the DPD within 
the context of social networking, the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party recently issued an Opinion93 not only clarifying key definitions, 
but also the application of the previously mentioned DPD exemptions. In 
response to their clarifications, several steps should be taken in order to 
comply with their recommendations. 
In its Opinion, the Working Party defined social networking sites as 
“information society services.”94 And, according to the Working Party, a 
social networking provider would be regarded as a “data controller.”95 
Application providers may fall within the scope of a data controller.96 
As a clarification to the application of Article 3.2 of the DPD, the 
Working Party indicated that there are certain instances when users will 
be found to fall outside the protections of the private purposes 
 
 91. See id. art. 21 (providing for the requirement for the processing of personal data in 
registers). 
 92. Id. art. 13. 
 93. See WP 163, supra note 70. 
 94. Id. § 2.  
 95. See id. § 3.1, at 5. 
 96. See id. A good example of an application provider would be the Beacon program 
available on Facebook. 
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exemption. For instance, an SNS user will not benefit from the private 
purposes exemption where he “acts on behalf of a company or 
association, or uses the SNS mainly as a platform to advance 
commercial, political or charitable goals.”97 Accordingly, profile 
information provided to an audience wider than a self-selected contacts 
list likely falls within the scope of the DPD.98 The Article 29 Working 
Party Opinion has advised that under those circumstances default settings 
favoring privacy should be applied.99 Additionally, even if Article 3.2 is 
not applicable, then “other exemptions such as the exemption for 
journalistic purposes, artistic or literary expression” may still be 
available.100 
Furthermore, the Article 29 Working Party has emphasized that “a 
balance needs to be struck between freedom of expression and the right 
to privacy.”101 The following suggested steps are ways to minimize the 
risk of contravening the national data protection laws. Social networking 
providers should, at a minimum, provide: 
 
1)Default privacy settings; 
2)Inform users of the privacy risks of uploading third party 
information; 
3)Make it clear to users that they need not submit sensitive data; 
4)Provide a mechanism whereby users can report concerns about 
5)applications; 
6)Personal data of users should not be kept after user account is 
deleted; and 
7)Give users and non-users the ability to change or delete 
personal data.102 
 
SNS users should: 
 
1)Obtain explicit consent to post personal data of a third 
party;103 and 
2)Have private profiles.104 
 
 
 97. WP 163, supra note 70, § 3.1.1. 
 98. See id. § 3.1.2. 
 99. See id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. §§ 3.2-3.6; see also id. § 5, ¶¶ 7–15. 
 103. Id. § 3.4. 
 104. Id. § 3.2. 
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The Article 29 Working Party has also indicated in their opinion that 
three distinctions should be made in the context of direct marketing 
aimed at users. These include: 
 
1)Contextual marketing; 
2)Segmented marketing aimed at a specific user group; and 
3)Behavioral marketing—advertisements based on their 
observation and analysis of user’s activity over time.105 
 
The Article 29 Working Party’s view is that sensitive data should not 
be used in “behavioural advertising models, unless all legal requirements 
are met.”106 They have further advised that pictures or information about 
other individuals should only be uploaded with the user’s consent.107 
Furthermore, the homepage of the social networking site should contain 
links to a complaint forum indicating data protection issues.108 
The recommendations submitted by the Article 29 Working Party are 
helpful, but counterintuitive in a way. In practicality, the expectations 
required of social networking providers to fulfill their responsibilities 
under the DPD are more easily fulfilled compared to the expectations 
required of SNS users who do not qualify for the Article 3.2 private 
purposes exemption. Should such a seeming inconsistency and injustice 
prevail in our current data protection laws? 
Since it was first passed in 2005, application of the DPD has raised 
questions over whether or not it is meeting its original aims. Even with 
guidance from the Article 29 Working Party, we are still considering 
these questions. We should consider whether SNS users’ ought to be 
governed by the current data protection laws in the face of social norms 
which allude to acceptable standards. For instance, a reasonable 
expectation to permit the use of personal information arises when an 
individual becomes a member of a group or an association (e.g., clubs, 
university class seminars, or research groups). Uploading information 
about these individuals becomes an expected part of that association’s 
work. If the DPD and corresponding national data protection laws are 
applied rigidly, the DPD appears to be over-protective and appears to 
demand too much of SNS users who do not fall within the private 
purposes exemption. The DPD has been criticized for being “excessive” 
and “burdensome.” Perhaps social norms and agreement to terms and 
 
 105. Id. § 3.7. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. § 5, ¶ 11. 
 108. Id. § 5, ¶ 12. 
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conditions of acceptability provided by a social networking provider 
should be sufficient.109 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The existent problems in applying the DPD to social networking 
sites may appear insurmountable now, but there are ways to ameliorate 
the current climate of uncertainty and provide a workable system. The 
thrust of the problem is that today, nearly anyone on a social networking 
site could be classified as a “data controller.” Requiring all individuals to 
abide by the data protection principles in such an environment would be 
difficult to police and enforce. The Article 29 Working Party Opinion 
has clarified the extent to which individuals are able to benefit from the 
Article 3.2 exemption and therefore potentially minimize lawsuits, but 
there are still gray areas where Article 3.2 may not apply. Social 
networking providers should ensure that SNS users are made fully aware 
of this. Given that Article 3.2 only applies in limited circumstances, this 
provision should be revised to include “non-commercial purposes” to 
allow for a broader context. Any changes to the Directive, however, 
would have to be achieved at a European Union level. A few possible 
solutions exist that could create a workable system. 
First, lawmakers should place more responsibility on social 
networking providers to ensure that the personal information of users is 
not misused by other individuals. Any refinement in legislation should 
include a mature realization that data protection principles need to be 
followed. This includes processing personal data lawfully and fairly,110 
and ensuring that requirements are not excessive in their scope. The 
interpretation, application, and harmonization of key legal concepts 
within the DPD, including national data protection laws as applied to 
social networks, will need to be considered by the national courts. The 
ECJ has begun this process with Lindqvist. 
Second, law makers should create a binding alternative dispute 
resolution process so that courts are not inundated with lawsuits. An 
independent arbitrator system would be an ideal solution. The arbitrator 
would hear social networking disputes on the condition that the parties 
 
 109. See Neil Robinson et al., Review of EU Data Protection Directive, (Info. Comm’r’s 
Office, Working Paper No. WR-607-ICO) (showing recent developments into data protection); C. 
Millard, The Future of Privacy: Part 1—“Privacy 1.0”: The Need for Change, E-COMM DATA 
PROT. L. & POL’Y (2007) 4(11) (advocating for needed areas of improvement to data protection 
provisions). 
 110. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 7, art. 6.1(a). 
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agree to be bound by decisions that are based on the applicable law.111 
Third, Supervisory Authorities should take a proactive approach to 
raise awareness of the applicability of the data protection laws to social 
networking sites. If the goal is to effectively apply the data protection 
laws to social networking sites, it is important that SNS users and social 
networking providers understand the extent of regulation and 
applicability. Social networking providers should consider building in 
“privacy conscious” ways to protect a user’s identity. Today, social 
networks are deploying sophisticated technological measures112 for the 
user to configure their privacy settings,113 but user etiquette remains 
largely unaddressed. Unfortunately, the seemingly simple solution of 
removal or deletion of the alleged contentious content opens other issues 
regarding freedom of speech and censorship.114 A proactive step could 
be to implement a simple education on user etiquette, which would be 
enforced mostly through peer pressure, coupled with a limited reactive 
deletion strategy.115 
While increasing responsibility of social networking providers, 
implementing effective alternative dispute resolution processes, and 
raising awareness regarding DPD laws and privacy issues would partially 
remedy a substantial component of the problem, these steps do not offer 
a complete solution. There is still much work to do in shaping data 
protection frameworks and laws to fit the needs of a fast- and ever-
changing landscape. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The growth of social networking websites have left the legal world in 
a game of “catch up.” Those charged with the development of data 
protection schemes continue to evaluate and make recommendations. 
Educating the younger generation and the neophyte user about the wider 
availability of personal information and the potential liability attached to 
its misuse is a good starting point. However, the data protection 
framework also needs to be strengthened so that it is more robust with 
stronger remedies for misuse of an individual’s personal information. 
This process has already begun with legislation being introduced by 
 
 111. Any applicable exemptions will be clearly and narrowly interpreted and applied. 
 112. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 3. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See Grimmelmann supra note 28. 
 115. See generally Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 
http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/ guide/index_e.cfm (discussing guidelines for data protection on 
social networking sites). 
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some Member States to strengthen the remedies and some Privacy 
Commissioners looking into the social networking issue.116 The Article 
29 Working Party’s Opinion addressing social networking issues is 
certainly a step in the right direction. While the legal game of “catch-up” 
may never be completely won, the progress being made is encouraging 
and will continue. 
As data protection authorities work through the problems, it is 
important that current data protection frameworks be applied in a 
reasonable fashion to social networking sites, and that SNS users’ 
frustrations and concerns continue to be of importance in the decision-
making process. Individual awareness, responsibility, and assistance 
through education will assist in abating the involuntary hijacking of 
private information. Users should be aware of the ongoing perils 
associated with using social networking sites so that social networking 
remains an enjoyable and useful activity while unauthorized 
impersonations of life become a welcome thing of the past. 
 
 
 116. See, e.g., U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES: SETTING THE 
MAXIMUM PENALTY (2009), http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/docs/civil-monetary-penalties-
consultation.pdf (discussing the UK Ministry of Justice’s process of consultation to increase the 
penalties for data breaches); see also Hunton and Williams LLP Privacy and Information Security 
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